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REDISCOVERING BOARD EXPERTISE: 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham* 
 
Abstract 
 
 This paper reviews and draws insights from recent empirical research in financial 
accounting on the value of director expertise for financial reporting quality.  Among 
important consequences of Sarbanes-Oxley is an increase in the percentage of 
accounting experts on boards of directors, particularly on audit committees.   
 The research reviewed here documents the value of this expertise in promoting 
financial reporting quality measured in terms of “accounting earnings management” 
(artificial bookkeeping manipulations). These findings contrast with well-known evidence 
showing little value arising from director independence.  
 The research holds numerous implications and raises important questions, 
including the following: 
 1. It shows that accounting expertise is more valuable than other kinds of 
financial expertise, suggesting that the SEC should reconsider its definition of this 
concept.    
 2. Although accounting earnings management has declined since SOX, real 
earnings management (substantive business decisions taken to achieve accounting 
results, like delaying or accelerating investment in a new plant) may be rising.  Do audit 
committee financial experts have a role to play in policing the latter?   
 3.  What role do such experts have in determining the degree of conservatism that 
a firm uses in its financial reporting, demand for which may differ as among 
shareholders, bondholders, employees and others?   
 4.  It is customary to see independence and expertise as trade offs.  This may be 
correct when expertise arises from insider status, but incorrect when the expertise is 
substantive knowledge in a discipline, such as accounting.   
 5.  Law has traditionally encouraged director independence and discouraged 
expertise but, this research suggests, that may be backwards and certainly requires 
reconsideration. 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, George Washington University.  Thanks to Richard Baker, Donald Clarke, Renee 
Jones, Troy Paredes and Robert Prentice.  This inquiry was prepared to appear as a Chapter in The New 
Corporate Governance, edited by Professor Paredes, and forthcoming from Cambridge University Press in 
2008. 
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REDISCOVERING BOARD EXPERTISE 
LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL LITERATURE 
 
Lawrence A. Cunningham 
 
 People are rediscovering the value of expertise on corporate boards of directors.  
The rediscovery occurs after several decades of celebrating independent directors under 
the guise of the “monitoring model” of boards.  While independence remains fashionable, 
and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) continues its longstanding promotion, SOX 
also requires companies to disclose whether their boards have expertise on the board 
audit committee and, if not, why not.1  This hastens an inchoate ten-year trend favoring 
expertise.  The value of expertise is supported by theory and empirical research.  
Accidents of political history appear to explain its subordination, until recently, to 
independence. 
 
 As a matter of theory, board expertise harmonizes with basic division of labor 
principles, yet little attention is paid to the specific expertise that directors offer.  The 
most prominent model of director expertise, developed during the rise of the monitoring 
board, envisioned an expertise in “decision control.”2   But this views boards as 
monoliths and hides the significance of individuals in group decision making.3 
Accompanying the rise of the monitoring board and its privileged place for independence 
was the rise of the board committee, especially the audit committee.  Although 
committees have designated functions, until recently the focus has been on member 
independence rather than expertise benefiting from division of labor.   
 
 As an empirical matter, the value of expertise is supported by a large body of 
research.  Most strikingly, research shows that accounting expertise is valuable in 
promoting audit committee effectiveness, while general financial and other expertise 
contribute less value.  The rise of independence and its displacement of expertise were 
due largely to periodic needs to quell political disputes or respond to crisis.  The appeal to 
independence helped generate consensus.  The rediscovery of the value of expertise 
appears after an abundance of empirical research showing that independence on boards of 
directors is of uncertain value at best.    
 
 Despite this rediscovery of the value of expertise, no statement of purpose 
accompanies the new imperatives for expertise.  Legal doctrines developed over several 
decades, based on the independence construct, should be reviewed to adapt to increased 
value resulting from reintroduction of expertise into the boardroom.  Restoring expertise 
                                                 
1 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §301, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1(m)(2) (2007). 
 
2  Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. & ECON. 301, 315 
(1983). 
 
3 See Darian M. Ibrahim, Individual or Collective Liability for Corporate Directors?, 93 IOWA L. REV. ___ 
(forthcoming 2008). 
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requires revisiting basic conceptions of corporate governance, including some encrusted 
principles of state corporation law and some recently developed gestures in securities 
regulation.  
 
 After a brief summary of the rise of board independence showing its political 
roots and uncertain economic value, analysis below considers the origins and current 
state of interest in director expertise.  This includes a review of the considerable body of 
recent empirical evidence showing high value of accounting expertise among directors on 
audit committees.  Analysis suggests that desired expertise for board audit committees 
centers on accounting expertise, rather than other types.  SOX rightly contemplated that 
kind of expertise but, under pressure, the Securities and Exchange Commission instead 
adopted an expansive conception of expertise that dilutes its value.  
 
 Discussion then explores more complex challenges that arise from rediscovering 
the value of expertise.  First, the purpose of accounting expertise on audit committees is 
not self-evident.  One issue concerns what scope of burden those experts bear: whether 
their enlistment to control “accounting earnings management” (artificial bookkeeping 
manipulations) extends to a mandate to control “real earnings management” (substantive 
business decisions taken to generate desired bookkeeping consequences).  Another is to 
whom audit committee accounting experts should be beholden, a 21st century twist on last 
century’s debate concerning for whom managers are trustees.  The current issue hinges 
on the meaning and beneficiaries of conservatism in accounting, considering competing 
demands for relative conservatism from varying corporate constituencies.  
 
 Second, it is customary to see independence and expertise as trade offs.  This 
view seems correct when expertise arises from insider status but incorrect when the 
expertise is substantive knowledge in a discipline.  It should be possible for a director to 
be both an expert and independent.  Indeed, empirical evidence shows that the 
combination of independence and expertise is uniquely valuable and should be 
encouraged.   Yet while law has long promoted independence, it discourages expertise.  
This appears to reflect unintended doctrinal consequences of the decades-long 
independence bias.  Accordingly, the rediscovered value of expertise demands doctrinal 
adjustments so that courts can bring law into line with what is known to work in 
corporate governance.   
 
I.  THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INDEPENDENCE 
 
 Two schools of thought have influenced conceptions of the corporation: a private 
law account based in trust and contract law, with shareholders as beneficiaries, versus a 
public law account based on state concessions of charter grants with multiple 
constituencies.  During the 20th century, the dominant view came to center on private 
shareholder interests to be advanced by boards—although standard formulations of 
directorial duty retain vestiges of the dueling schools when invariably announcing that 
directors must act in the interests of “the corporation and its shareholders.”4 
                                                 
4 See William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 
261 (1992). 
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A.  Politics 
 
 The assumptions of private ordering were first tested amid the economic 
upheavals of the 1930s and ensuing regulatory frenzy and academic debates.  A series of 
exchanges from 1931 to 1935 between Professors Adolph Berle and Merrick Dodd reflect 
the familiar positions.5  Professor Berle saw the corporation as involving a 
relinquishment of control by shareholders to corporate managers and believed that the 
resulting separation of ownership from control required imposing trust-like duties on 
managers to act for shareholder benefit.  Professor Dodd, accepting that separation 
existed, proposed to fill it not with managerial duties to shareholders but with managerial 
duties to various corporate constituencies that included employees and communities.6  
 
 With a nod to Dodd, contemporaneous legislative reforms occurred at the federal 
level.  But they mostly embraced Berle’s stance, with the role for independent directors to 
promote investor interests, not broader public ones. The political role of independent 
directors thus appears at this early stage, reflecting how the new federal securities laws 
were “a pragmatic compromise between proponents of direct federal control over 
corporations through chartering [and] those who sought to leave all regulation of 
corporations to the states.”7   
 
 This model was tested again during the turmoil from the mid-1960s to the late 
1970s.  Investigations into the Watergate scandal revealed that US corporations made 
extensive and illicit bribes to foreign officials—without accurately accounting for them.8  
Flurries of SEC consent orders mandated corporate governance reforms, with an 
emphasis on installing independent directors.9 This began a custom, which continues 
today, of responding to corporate crisis by looking to independent directors.  Then, 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
5 Adolph A. Berle, Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (1931); E. Merrick 
Dodd, Jr., For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1145 (1932); Adolph A. 
Berle, For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note, 45 HARV. L. REV 1365 (1932); E. Merrick 
Dodd, Jr., Is Effective Enforcement of the Fiduciary Duties of Corporate Managers Practicable?, 2 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 194 (1935). 
 
6 This is obviously an over-generalized summary of these stances, which are far more complex and must be 
understood in their historical context.  For those purposes, see William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, 
Shareholder Primacy’s Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and ‘The Modern Corporation”, Research Paper 
(Oct. 9, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1021273. 
 
7 See Roberta S. Karmel, The Independent Corporate Board: A Means to What End?, 52 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 534 (1984). 
 
8 E.g, SEC v. ITT Corp., 1979 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 96,948 (D.D.C. Aug. 8, 1979); SEC v. Lockheed, 
[1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,509 (D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1976). 
 
9 See Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive 
Actions, 31 BUS. LAW. 1323 (1976); Lewis D. Solomon, Restructuring the Corporate Board of Directors: 
Fond Hope, Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978). 
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Congress banned such bribes and mandated systems of internal control and maintaining 
books and records to promote faithful financial reporting.10   
 
 The period’s lack of directorial oversight is understandable, however, for 
Delaware courts had told directors a decade earlier (in 1963) that they had no duty to 
maintain internal control or to discover mis-reporting within corporations whose boards 
they occupied.11 Joining Congress, in the wake of the bribery scandals, Delaware courts 
began a decades-long process of rewarding the use of independent directors.  In opinions 
arising out of related derivative litigation, they accorded special deference to decisions of 
independent directors serving on special litigation committees and made this role pivotal 
to the law of demand futility in derivative litigation.12  
 
 Amid a campaign for corporate social responsibility led by Ralph Nader and Joel 
Seligman,13  Melvin Eisenberg14 focused inquiry on variation between state law, which 
said that boards were to manage the corporation, and practice, which showed that they 
did no such thing.15  A brilliant political compromise resulted in the demise of the 
advisory board model—seen as non-functional—and its replacement with the monitoring 
board and a heightened emphasis on independence and subordination of expertise.  Yet 
no consensus existed concerning exactly what independent directors were to do16—or 
how independence was to be defined.17   
 
 The 1980s takeover boom gave independent directors a specific role.  Delaware 
courts, continuing a pattern dating at least to the bribery scandal litigation, strengthened 
                                                 
10 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2); see SEC v. World-Wide Coin Investments, Ltd., 
567 F. Supp. 724 (N.D. Ga. 1983). 
 
11 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. 1963). 
 
12 Zapata v. Maldanado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 
1979).  
 
13  See RALPH NADER ET AL., TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 123-28 (1976).  
 
14 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976).  
 
15 See William O. Douglas, Directors Who Do Not Direct, 47 HARV. L. REV. 1305 (1934); MYLES MACE, 
DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth and Reality—Ten Years Later, 
32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979). 
 
16 The monitoring model and its independent directors arrived with critics, including well-chronicled 
debates within the American Law Institute (ALI) and between the ALI and the Business Roundtable and 
American Bar Association.  For a thorough analytical review of this history, Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of 
Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 
STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007). 
 
17  See Donald C. Clarke, Three Models of the Independent Director, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007). 
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the appeal of independent directors by increasingly deferring to their decisions.18 Using 
independent directors insulated from judicial review self-interested transactions,19 cash-
out mergers,20 adoption of poison pills,21 resisting hostile takeover threats22 and simply 
“saying no” to them.23  Delaware law eschewed the question of director expertise, 
although the New Jersey Supreme Court famously announced that the duty of care 
requires directors to examine and understand a corporation’s financial statements.24 
 
 By the 1990s, director independence was heralded to solve virtually all corporate 
governance challenges.25 The construct became a routine policy tool, used in numerous 
contexts.26  Independence was to promote optimal compensation and recruiting despite 
directors lacking expertise in the relevant subjects.  Some promoted “perspective and 
diversity” on boards,27 which may be seen as a kind of expertise, such as sensitivity to the 
interests of other constituencies, although it remained true that no expertise was sought 
on behalf of traditional, shareholder, constituencies   State courts made using independent 
directors irresistible to corporations, giving deference to decisions that were widely 
condemned and hard to defend so long as made by independent directors.28  
 
 These ambitions continued in response to the parade of accounting scandals that 
erupted in the early 2000s—epitomized by revelation that Enron Corp., nominally the 7th 
largest US corporation—were elaborate frauds.  In their immediate aftermath, politically 
astute corporate leaders sought to avert regulation by advocating reforms that 
                                                 
18 On the previous pattern, see Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards (Sept. 9, 2005) 
(unpublished manuscript) (principal role of independent directors before the 1970s, and to a lesser extent 
since, was sanitizing interested-director transactions and providing insulation from liability) 
 
19 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987); see also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 
1976). 
 
20 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
 
21 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
 
22 Unocal v. Mesa Petroleum, Inc., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
 
23 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 
24 Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814 (N.J. 1981). 
 
25 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Corporation, 2004 NZ L. REV. 707, 719 (2004). 
 
26 These included concerning (a) compensation disclosure (1992); (b) tax deductibility of certain 
compensation expenses (1994); and (c) application of short swing profit rules (1996).  
 
27 See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 48 BUS. 
LAW. 59, 67-68 (1992). 
 
28  See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 
2005). 
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concentrated on increasingly using independent directors.29  While this effort failed, 
when Congress intervened by passing SOX, it continued the habit of celebrating director 
independence.  Despite continuing resort to independent directors for political purposes 
or in response to crisis, there has never been much evidence of related benefits.30 
 
B.  Economics 
 
 At Enron and firms that committed other frauds of the early 2000s, boards were 
endowed with abundant independence, yet failed miserably.  This is unsurprising 
considering a comprehensive 1999 survey of empirical studies that found little correlation 
between independence and corporate performance.31 In fact, as two recent updated 
reviews of this literature attest, the considerable evidence shows at beast weak correlation 
between board independence and corporate performance.32   
 
 Evidence is slightly stronger of correlations between director independence and 
specific tasks.  Some evidence suggests that independence associates with prudent cash 
management and facilitating or resisting changes in corporate control.  Independent 
directors may be better at firing sub-par managers, although evidence is slight and 
scattered.   
 
 There is little or no evidence that independent directors achieve greater gains for 
takeover targets or adopt different defensive profiles than other directors.  Evidence 
conflicts on whether firms with independent boards are less likely to make value reducing 
takeover bids; any effect that appears is small.  Research does not show any particular 
effects of independence on CEO compensation.  Evidence does show a relation between 
board and audit committee independence—and expertise—and various measures of 
financial reporting quality (but that gets ahead of the story and will be discussed in the 
next Part). 
 
 While scholars generally construe the empirical evidence as not supporting claims 
that independent directors improve firm performance, that conclusion is not inevitable.   
Professor Jeffrey Gordon reinterprets the empirical relations by explaining the data on 
other grounds.33 This reinterpretation emphasizes diminishing returns to independence, 
                                                 
29 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, A Critique of the NYSE’s Director Independence Listing Standards, 30 SEC. 
REG. L.J. 370 (2002). 
 
30 See Laura Lin, The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories 
and Evidence, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 898 (1996). 
 
31 Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm 
Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation Between 
Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002). 
 
32 The comprehensive reviews are Gordon, supra note ___ and Robert A. Prentice & David B. Spence, 
Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843 
(2006).  Readers are referred to these works for citations to the research summarized in the next paragraph. 
 
33 Gordon, supra note ___ . 
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because the data all look at changes in independence levels during periods after the 
construct had achieved normative status.  The more important effects may be systemic, 
not unique to individual enterprises, and include more accurate stock prices and fuller 
financial disclosure that benefits all enterprises, according to Professor Gordon. 
 
 Another basis for reinterpreting the studies that examine corporate performance is 
how independent directors may contribute other skills such as promoting compliance or 
advancing social interests. This view seems plausible given how some original 
proponents of the monitoring board sought to promote compliance amid the bribery 
scandals and some current champions continue to seek compliance, especially with 
financial reporting requirements.34 These purposes may not translate into measurable 
improvements in corporate performance (indeed Professor Daniel Fischel warned of, and 
some proponents advocated, the opposite).35   
 
 On the other hand, this reinterpretation fits uneasily alongside studies showing 
weak correlations between independence and specific tasks, suggesting yet other 
possibilities: that nominal independence was subverted by managerial control over the 
appointments process36 or that nominal independence transforms into structural bias once 
an outsider joins a board.37  In any event, the independent director remains a powerful 
norm, despite initial and continuing disagreement about its purposes or effects.  However, 
there is an emerging appeal for expertise that promises to alter conventional attitudes 
towards boards in corporate governance.38 
 
II. THE EMERGING APPEAL FOR EXPERTISE 
 
 The fascination for independent directors that arose in the 1970s brought 
increased attention to board committees, especially audit, compensation and nominating 
committees.39  This attention implicitly recognized the value of division of labor on a 
board of directors.  Yet there was little discussion of the qualifications that would be put 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
34 See Prentice & Spence, supra note ___, at 1868.   
 
35 See Daniel J. Fischel, The Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259 (1982). 
 
36 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and 
Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C.L. REV. 1861, 1867-68 (1995). 
 
37 See James D. Cox & Donald E. Schwartz, The Business Judgment Rule in the Context of Termination of 
Derivative Suits by Independent Committees, 61 N.C. L. REV. 541, 542-43 (1983). 
 
38 Previous efforts to overcome the independence obsession have called for accountability, although that is 
not the same as the call for expertise.  E.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside 
Director: An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 865 (1991). 
 
39 See ABA Comm. on Corporate Laws, Corporate Director’s Guidebook, 33 BUS. LAW. 1591, 1619-20 
(1978); Bus. Roundtable, Statement, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large 
Publicly Owned Corporation, 33 BUS. LAW. 2083, 2108-10 (1978). 
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to use by these committees.  Instead, the motivation was to put certain kinds of decisions 
in the hands of independent directors, whether they had expertise or not.   
 
 A changing of the guard is afoot, with expertise becoming at least as important as 
independence in corporate governance.  That change was led by stock exchanges in the 
late 1990s and reinforced with SOX’s encouragement of expertise on audit committees in 
2002.  In the five years since SOX, the percentage of accountants on board audit 
committees has doubled and the trend appears likely to continue.40 
 
A.  Audit Committees 
 
 It has long been recognized that the audit committee is the most important board 
committee.41   Proposals for mandatory audit committees date to the late 1930s and early 
1940s.42  Interest resumed in the late 1960s and gathered momentum through the 1970s.43  
In the 1970s, the SEC encouraged using independent directors on audit committees;44 
adopted rules requiring companies to disclose whether or not they had an audit 
committee;45 and published guidelines addressing audit committee attributes.46 As a 
result, audit committee use expanded dramatically from the mid-1960s, when they were 
relatively rare, to the mid-1970s, when they became commonplace.47   
 
                                                 
40 See Stephen Taub, Audit Committees Embracing Accountants, CFO MAGAZINE, CFO.com (Sept. 21, 
2007) (referring to a report from Huron Consulting Group). 
 
41 See PricewaterhouseCoopers, What Directors Think Annual Survey (2005). 
 
42  See In re McKesson & Robbins, Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 2707, [1940 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. 
L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,020 (Dec. 5, 1940); Edward F. Greene & Bernard B. Falk, The Audit Committee: A 
Measured Contribution to Corporate Governance [and] A Realistic Appraisal of Its Objectives and 
Functions, 34 BUS. LAW. 1229, 1233 n.16 (1979) (noting 1939 NYSE proposal). 
 
43  See Greene & Falk, supra note ___, at 1233 & n.16, 1234 (noting 1967 proposal made by the AICPA);  
Subcomm. on Oversight & Investigations of the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th 
Cong., Report on Federal Regulation and Regulatory Reform 29-42 (Subcomm. Print 1976).  
 
44 See SEC, Standing Audit Committees Composed of Outside Directors, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 78,670, at 81,424 (No. 9548, Mar. 23, 1972). 
 
45 Item 8(e), Schedule 14A, 17 C.F.R. §240.14a-101 (1978).  
 
46 SEC, Notice of Amendments to Require Increased Disclosure of Relationships between Registrants and 
Their Independent Public Accountants, 40 Fed. Reg. 1010 (1974), reprinted in [Accounting Series Release 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,187, at 62,394 (No. 11147, Dec. 20, 1974); Proposed Rules 
Relating to Shareholder Communications, Shareholder Participation in the Corporate Electoral Process and 
Corporate Governance Generally, Exchange Act Release No. 14,970, 15 SEC Docket 291 (July 18, 1978). 
 
47 See Gordon, supra note ___, at n. 211 (citing evidence that in 1967 from 1/3 to 1/5 of companies boasted 
audit committees whereas by 1977 nearly all did). 
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 The NYSE adopted a 1977 listing requirement mandating independent directors 
on audit committees.48   The provision offered a capacious conception of independence.  
It allowed persons having “customary” commercial and professional relationships with 
the company, so long as this did not otherwise pose a threat to independent judgment. 
This formulation may strike contemporary students as nearly empty given current 
sensibilities about independence.  But at the time, the provision was a significant change 
and the “customary relationships” exception was not seen to nullify the innovation.49  The 
other exchanges followed the NYSE’s lead during the 1980s.50 
 
 A series of audit failures in the early 1980s sparked interest in accounting aspects 
of corporate governance.  In 1987, the AICPA and others sponsored the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Practices.  In addition to founding COSO—which 
became the chief architect of corporate internal controls51—it produced a Report of the 
National Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting.52  This Commission, named for 
Chairman James Treadway, recommended that boards be required to have independent 
audit committees and suggested the high value of accounting expertise for audit 
committee members.  No official action was taken on the recommendations as the late 
1980s turned into the roaring 1990s. 
 
 In 1994, the Public Oversight Board of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA 
formed an advisory panel to give auditing a central role in corporate governance and 
return auditing to an important place in society.53  It urged that audit committees be 
informed as to the appropriateness of a company’s accounting principles and the degree 
of conservatism in their application.54  This demand for information is a precursor to 
ensuing calls for actual knowledge—expertise—on audit committees.   
 
 Those calls began in the late 1990s, when SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt launched 
a campaign to improve corporate governance by emphasizing expertise, not mere 
                                                 
48 Proposed Rule Change by Self-Regulatory Organizations, 42 Fed. Reg. 8737 (Feb. 11, 1977); Securities 
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977), 11 SEC Docket 1945, 1946 (1977); Order Approving 
Proposed Rule Change, 42 Fed. Reg. 14,793 (Mar. 16, 1977). 
 
49 See  Karmel, supra note ___, at ____ (citing Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,346 (Mar. 9, 1977), 
11 SEC Docket 1945, 1946 (1977). 
 
50  See Karmel, supra note ___, text at notes 69-70. 
 
51 See www.coso.org (COSO stands for the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations that established the 
working group). 
 
52 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING (1987), available at: 
www.coso.org/Publications/NCFFR.pdf.  
 
53 See www.publicoversightboard.org/about.htm  
 
54 See PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD, 1994 REPORT. 
. 
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independence.55  He urged companies to recruit more audit committee members with 
financial experience.  A group he empanelled echoed the point, urging that audit 
committees have at least three financially literate members and one with financial 
management experience.56  The NYSE and Nasdaq adopted these recommendations 
under rules, still in effect, requiring all audit committee members to be financially literate 
and show financial sophistication, demonstrated by oversight responsibilities, past 
experience, or professional certification. 57 
 
 SOX reformed structural features as well as highlighting abstract independence 
and substantive expertise.  Previously, power over the audit function was lodged with 
outside auditors and internal management, with limited audit committee oversight.58  
Managers hired, fired and paid auditors, so auditors were beholden to them—not to the 
committee.  An independent and expert committee under those circumstances might be 
worth little.  SOX puts the committee in charge and vests it with important powers.59  
This alters the monitoring model, equipping independent—and now expert—directors 
with power they never had before.60   
 
 SOX injects expertise into the audit committee indirectly.  It requires companies 
to disclose whether the audit committee boasts expertise or not (and if not, why not).  
Even so, this gesture towards expertise is a dramatic change from the traditional habit of 
simply adding formal independence (although SOX indulges that habit too, as noted).61 
                                                 
55 See Arthur Levitt, The “Numbers Game”, Remarks at the New York University Center for Law and 
Business (Sept. 28, 1998), available at www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch220.txt.  
 
56 See Ira M. Millstein, Introduction to the Report and Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Committee on 
Improving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees, 54 BUS. LAW. 1057 (1999).  The group also 
followed the tradition of boosting independence, including by recommending eliminating the allowance of 
the “customary relationships” loophole appearing in previous definitions. 
 
57   NYSE Listed Company Manual 303.01(B)(2)(a) and 303.01(B)(2)(b)-(c); NASD By-Laws, Art. 9, Sec. 
5; NASD Marketplace Rules, Sec. 4350(d)(1)-(2).  NYSE listing rules also currently require compensation 
and nominating committees, both with independent directors, but are silent as to desired expertise.  NYSE, 
Inc., Listed Company Manual §303A.04-.05 (2007). 
 
58 On the problems embedded in the old relationship, see Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal Models of 
Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors and Accountants, 63 CAL. L. REV. 
375 (1975).  
 
59 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §301, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1(m)(2) (2007); see Strengthening 
Requirements Regarding Auditor Independence, Securities Act Release No. 8183, Exchange Act Release 
No. 47,265, Public Utility Holding Company Act Release No. 27,642, Investment Company Act Release 
No. 25,915, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2103, 68 Fed. Reg. 6006 (Feb. 5, 2003).   
 
60 William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules versus Principles versus Rents, 48 
VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1034-36 (2003). 
 
61 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §301, codified at 15 U.S.C. §78j-1(m)(2) (2007) (“to be considered to be 
independent for purposes of this paragraph, a member of an audit committee of an issuer may not, other 
than in his or her capacity as a member of the audit committee, the board of directors, or any other board 
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SOX conceives of the required audit committee expertise in explicit, focused terms, 
measuring expertise by formal training and experience in accounting.62  But SOX also 
directed and deferred to the SEC to define the requisite expertise in implementing the 
statute.   
 
 In its first proposed definition, the SEC followed SOX’s language to draw 
expertise narrowly, emphasizing knowledge of accounting through extensive experience 
in the field.63  This conception is now described in the literature as an “accounting 
financial expert”—only professional accountants qualified.  Critics objected to the 
narrow definition.  Some claimed that, under it, financial heavyweights like Warren 
Buffett and Alan Greenspan would not qualify as experts; others said it would be hard to 
attract people who met the narrow definition and that the narrow skills would absorb 
limited resources needed to recruit other persons with other desirable skill sets. 64 
 
 In response to objections, the SEC broadened the definition beyond accounting 
experience to include experience in finance, financial statement analysis or evaluation 
and even supervision of accounting and financial executives or personnel.65 The revised 
definition resembles the definitions of expertise adopted a decade earlier by the NYSE 
and Nasdaq.  No longer limited to professional accountants, nearly anyone in business 
qualifies—managers of other companies, investment bankers, commercial bankers and 
venture capitalists. Reflecting this broad definition, three categories of audit committee 
experts are now described in the literature: accounting experts, non-accounting financial 
experts, and non-financial experts. 
 
B.  Evidence 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
committee (i) accept any consulting, advisory, or other compensatory fee from the issuer; or (ii) be an 
affiliated person of the issuer or any subsidiary thereof.”). 
 
62 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §___, codified at 15 U.S.C. §____ (2007). 
 
63 SEC Release (Oct. 22, 2002). The SEC’s proposed definition of financial expert mimicked SOX’s 
language, saying SOX requires the SEC, in defining, financial expert:  
 
to consider whether a person has, through education and experience as a public 
accountant or auditor or a principal financial officer, or controller, or principal accounting 
officer of an issuer, or from a position involving the performance of similar functions: (1) 
an understanding of [GAAP] and financial statements; (2) experience in (a) the 
preparation or auditing of financial statements of generally comparable issuers and (b) the 
application of such principles in connection with the accounting for estimates, accruals 
and reserves; (3) experience with internal accounting controls; and (4) an understanding 
of the audit committee functions. 
Id. 
 
64 See C. Bryan-Low, Defining Moment for SEC: Who’s a Financial Expert?, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 9, 2002). 
 
65 SEC Release (Jan. 23, 2003) (coining the designation “audit committee financial expert”). 
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 Empirical evidence on the correlation between director independence and 
corporate performance reveals weak links, as discussed above.66  The exception is a well-
developed body of evidence demonstrating a strong positive correlation between director 
independence and financial reporting quality (measured in various ways, as discussed 
below).67  Researchers and theorists struggled to interpret this exception and soon 
ascertained that it operates through audit committees.68  Increasingly, evidence shows 
that this correlation strengthens significantly when accounting experts serve on audit 
committees (and strengthens incrementally when audit committee members have other 
expertise encompassed in the SEC’s expansive, criticism-induced, definition). 
 
 Research has long examined the correlation between board level independence 
and various proxies for financial reporting quality.  Evidence shows a strong negative 
correlation between relative board independence and accounting fraud.69  A similar 
pattern appears in relation to the probability of financial misreporting, with pending SEC 
enforcement actions and shareholder lawsuits serving as a proxy.70  These results are 
corroborated in tests that use other proxies of financial statement reliability, including the 
presence of abnormal accruals and other signs of earnings management.71  Similar results 
were obtained when the independence of audit committees was examined discretely, 
                                                 
66 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
67 See Prentice & Spence, supra note ___, at 1869 (“the vast bulk of existing empirical studies indicates that 
more board independence does translate into more accurate financial reporting”); id. at 1869 (“[M]ost 
evidence supports the . . .  conclusion that more independence means less financial monkey business”). 
 
68 See Gordon, supra note ___, at 1504 (the “best-developed evidence” is a “positive association between 
board independence and financial reporting accuracy” [and why it occurs is not certain] but “some studies 
suggest it could be through the independent audit committee”). 
 
69 Mark S. Beasley, An Empirical Analysis of the Relation Between the Board of Director Composition and 
Financial Statement Fraud, 71 ACCT. REV. 443, 455 (1996) (negative association between accounting 
fraud and relative board independence); see also Mark S. Beasley et al., Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 
Consideration of Industry Traits and Corporate Governance Mechanisms, 14 ACCT. HORIZONS 441, 452 
(2000) (negative association between independence and fraud in several industries); Hatice Uzun et al., 
Board Composition and Corporate Fraud, FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 2004, at 33 (similar relationship 
using broader proxy for fraud).  
 
70 Patricia M. Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation: An Analysis of Firms 
Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1, 21 (1996) (comparing firms with 
high likelihood of accounting fraud, as signaled by SEC enforcement action, with a control group of firms); 
David W. Wright, Evidence on the Relation Between Corporate Governance Characteristics and the 
Quality of Financial Reporting (May 1996), working paper www.ssrn.com/abstract=10138 (firms facing 
SEC enforcement actions sport less audit committee independence compared to sample of industry or size 
cohort); Eric Helland & Michael E. Sykuta, Who’s Monitoring the Monitor? Do Outside Directors Protect 
Shareholders’ Interests?, 40 FIN. REV. 155, 171 (2005) (association between independence and fewer 
shareholder lawsuits). 
 
71 April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management, 33 J. 
ACCT. & ECON. 375, 387 (2002) (negative association between board independence and abnormal 
accruals); Sarah E. McVay et al., Trading Incentives to Meet the Analyst Forecast, 11 REV. ACCT. STUD. 
575, 575 (2006) (earnings management “is weaker in the presence of an independent board”). 
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finding that independence is associated with lower levels of earnings manipulation or 
accounting fraud.72   
 
 The idea that audit committee expertise might contribute to more accurate 
financial reporting is intuitive.73   This intuition was the basis for early interest in 
promoting expertise, including the Treadway Commission’s recommendations.74 
Experimental studies show the relativity of expertise, ranging from the command of 
rudimentary knowledge (“literacy”) to experiential knowledge derived from extensive 
applications in practice (“actual expertise”).75 Also intuitively, neither independence nor 
expertise contributes to results unless those commanding such traits have power to 
implement recommendations76 (a result that SOX’s structural audit committee reforms 
make promising).   
 
 Empirical evidence supports these intuitions.  Extensive research investigates the 
correlation between various conceptions of audit committee expertise and related proxies 
for financial reporting quality (sometimes thought of as audit committee effectiveness).  
Studies show an inverse relationship between expertise and likelihood of: financial 
                                                 
72  Jeffrey Cohen, Ganesh Krishnamoorthy & Arnold M. Wright, The Corporate Governance Mosaic and 
Financial Reporting Quality, 23 J. ACCT. LIT. 87, 99-102 (2004) (surveying studies of relationship between 
governance characteristics, especially of audit committee independence, and earnings manipulation or 
fraud); compare Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics, and Earnings Management, 
supra note ___ (association between abnormal accruals and independent directors but “no meaningful 
relation between abnormal accruals and having an audit committee comprised solely of independent 
directors”). 
 
73 E.g., Stephen A. Scarpati, CPAs as Audit Committee Members, 196 J. ACCOUNTANCY 32 (2003);  F. 
Todd DeZoort, An Investigation of Audit Committees’ Oversight Responsibilities, 33 ABACUS 208 (1997); 
Kannan Raghunandan & William J. Read, The State of Audit Committees, 191 J. ACCOUNTANCY 57 (2001); 
Kannan Raghunandan, William J. Read & Dasaratha V. Rama, Audit Committee Composition, “Gray 
Directors,” and Interaction with Internal Auditing, 15 ACCT. HORIZONS 105 (2001); Dorothy A. McMullen 
& Kannan Raghunandan, Enhancing Audit Committee Effectiveness, J. ACCOUNTANCY 182 (1996) 
(companies with deficient financial reporting less likely to have CPAs on audit committee). 
 
74 See I. Bull & Florence C. Sharp, Advising Clients on Treadway Audit Committee Recommendations, 167 
J. ACCOUNTANCY 46 (1989). 
 
75 See Linda S. McDaniel et al., Evaluating Financial Reporting Quality: The Effects of Financial Expertise 
vs. Financial Literacy, 77 ACCT. REV. 139 (Supp. 2002) (experimental research using audit managers as 
“experts” and Executive MBA graduates as “literates” and finding that experts are better than literates at 
evaluating financial reporting quality). 
 
76 See Lawrence P. Kalbers & Timothy J. Fogarty, Audit Committee Effectiveness: An Empirical 
Investigation of the Contribution of Power, 12 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 24 (1993) (examining 
relation between audit committee power and effectiveness, finding that “expert power” is highly associated 
with financial reporting effectiveness).  The internal control apparatus within an enterprise also has a 
bearing on the effectiveness of both corporate governance and financial reporting.  See Robert A. Prentice, 
Sarbanes-Oxley: The Evidence Regarding Section 404, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. ___ (forthcoming 2007), 
available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=991295 (manuscript at 12-22) (reviewing empirical studies 
concentrating on the association between internal control aspects of Sarbanes-Oxley and various proxies for 
corporate governance and reporting effectiveness). 
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reporting irregularities,77 artificial earnings management,78 fraud79 and restatements.80  
Various degrees of expertise also associate with higher financial statement quality,81 
more conservative accounting82 and a propensity to provide or update managerial 
forecasts containing adverse rather than favorable news.83  Studies show that greater 
expertise is associated with less-frequent suspicious auditor switching84 and lower 
likelihood of material weaknesses in internal controls.85 
 
 Recent research examines more closely various conceptions of audit committee 
expertise.  This is motivated by debates concerning how to define expertise, especially by 
comparing the SEC’s initial and revised definitions of expertise for audit committees.86  
Evidence is strong that there is a correlation between accounting expertise and high 
quality financial statements and audit committee effectiveness.87  There is also some (but 
                                                 
77 See Dorothy A. McMullen & Kannan Raghunandan, Enhancing Audit Committee Effectiveness, 182 J. 
ACCOUNTANCY 79 (1996). 
 
78 See Biao Xie et al., Earnings Management and Corporate Governance: The Role of the Board and the 
Audit Committee, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 295 (2003). 
 
79 See Anup Agrawal & Sahiba Chadha, Corporate Governance and Accounting Scandals, 48 J. L. & ECON. 
371 (2005). 
 
80 See Lawrence J. Abbott, et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and Restatements, 23 AUDITING: J. 
PRAC. THEORY 69 (2004). 
 
81 See Andrew J. Felo, Srinivasan Krishanmurthy & Steven A. Solieri, Audit Committee Characteristics 
and the Perceived Quality of Financial Reporting: An Empirical Analysis (working paper 2003). 
 
82 See Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the Sox Definition of an Accounting Expert 
Matter? The Association between Audit Committee Director’s Expertise and Conservatism, 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884. 
 
83 See L. Karamanou & Nicos Vafeas, The Association between Corporate Boards, Audit Committees, and 
Management Earnings Forecasts: An Empirical Analysis, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 453 (2005) (propensity to 
update forecasts for bad news more likely when audit committee boasts expertise). 
 
84 See Deborah Archambeault & F. Todd DeZoort, Auditor Opinion Shopping and the Audit Committee: An 
Analysis of Suspicious Auditor Switches, 5 INT’L J. ACCT. 33 (2001). 
 
85 See Yan Zhang et al, Audit Committee Quality, Auditor Independence and Internal Control Weaknesses, 
J. ACCT. & PUBLIC POLICY (2006) (SOX internal control weakness more likely for firms with audit 
committees boasting less accounting financial expertise). 
 
86 As discussed above, SOX and the SEC first floated a narrow definition of expertise limited to accounting 
expertise but the SEC, under pressure, expanded it to include other kinds of financial expertise (non-
accounting financial expertise) as well as expertise in supervising accountants and other financial experts 
(non-financial expertise).   
 
87 See, e.g., Dan Dhaliwal, Vic Naiker & Farshid Navissi, The Association between Audit Committee 
Accounting Expertise, Corporate Governance and Accruals Quality: An Empirical Analysis (Jan. 2006); 
Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, April Klein & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (Feb. 2006). 
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limited) evidence of a correlation between non-accounting financial expertise and those 
virtues.88  Evidence is strong that there is no particular correlation between non-financial 
expertise and various measures of financial statement reliability or general audit 
committee effectiveness.89 
 
 Some of this research emphasizes normative implications.  Several studies 
expressly support the SEC’s original narrow definition of expertise as opposed to the 
broader definition it later adopted under pressure. Classifying audit committee members 
as boasting accounting, non-accounting financial and other non-financial expertise, one 
study finds a significant positive correlation between accounting expertise and accruals 
quality, but no such correlation with the other two kinds of expertise.90  The prescription 
is to favor SOX’s and the SEC’s first narrow definition—recognizing that other 
committee features can influence effectiveness too.91  Using similar definitions, another 
study likewise finds a correlation between accounting expertise and accounting 
conservatism, but no correlation between other expertise and that quality—also expressly 
supporting SOX’s and the SEC’s original narrow definition.92 
 
 Another study stating normative implications finds the strongest correlation is 
with accounting expertise, following similar definitional classifications.93 Accounting 
expertise and some non-accounting financial expertise are associated with lesser earnings 
management for firms with weak alternate corporate governance mechanisms.  But 
                                                 
88 See, e.g., Jean Bedard, Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou & Lucie Courteau, The Effect of Audit Committee 
Expertise, Independence and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & 
THEORY 13 (2004); Lawrence J. Abbott et al., Audit Committee Characteristics and Financial 
Misstatement: A Study of the Efficacy of Certain Blue Ribbon Committee Recommendations (Mar. 2002) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=319125. 
 
89 See, e.g., Joseph V. Carcello & Terry L. Neal, Audit Committee Characteristics and Auditor Dismissals 
Following “New” Going Concern Reports, 78 ACCT. REV. 95 (2003); Robert C. Anderson et al., Board 
Characteristics, Accounting Report Integrity and the Cost of Debt, 37 J. ACCT. & ECON. 315 (2004). 
 
90 Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, supra note ___. Following an emerging standardization of these 
classifications in the empirical literature, the study delimits them as follows: accounting expertise is current 
or past experience as CPA, CFO, comptroller, VP finance or “any other major accounting positions”; 
finance expertise is current or past experience as investment banker, financial analyst or “any other 
financial management roles;” and supervisory expertise is current or past experience as CEO or company 
president or the like.  Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, supra note ___. 
 
91 Notably, the Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi study also finds significant positive interaction between audit 
committee accounting expertise and attributes that signal strong audit committee governance (namely 
independence, a relatively larger size and more frequent meetings). Dhaliwal, Naiker & Navissi, supra note 
___. 
 
92 Gopal V. Krishnan & Gnanakumar Visvanathan, Does the Sox Definition of an Accounting Expert 
Matter? The Association between Audit Committee Director’s Expertise and Conservatism, 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=866884. 
 
93 Joseph V. Carcello, Carl W. Hollingsworth, April Klein & Terry Neal, Audit Committee Financial 
Expertise, Competing Corporate Governance Mechanisms, and Earnings Management (Feb. 2006). 
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independent audit committee members with financial expertise are most successful in 
mitigating earnings management.  The researchers emphasize that “alternative corporate 
governance mechanisms are an effective substitute for audit committee financial 
expertise.”94 The normative implication: firms should have flexibility to choose the 
governance mechanisms that fit their unique situations, recognizing the likely value of 
accounting expertise on audit committees. 
 
 Research also considers market reaction to adding various kinds of expertise to 
audit committees.  A widely-cited study found favorable market reactions to companies 
naming new audit committee members boasting accounting expertise, especially when 
other good governance attributes exist, but no reaction to non-accounting expertise.95 
These researchers emphasize that the findings are consistent with accounting expertise on 
audit committees improving corporate governance, but only when the expert and the 
corporation’s other governance attributes empower experts to make a difference.96  This 
market-based study thus is consistent with the other empirical research as well as 
longstanding intuition that accountants will contribute accounting expertise when 
empowered to do so. 
 
 Given the normative prescriptions of such studies, it’s worth noting that some 
studies find a correlation between broader conceptions of expertise and desirable 
financial reporting traits.  For example, one study found a correlation between financial 
and governance expertise and lower levels of earnings management and even some 
correlation between other kinds of firm-specific expertise and that quality.97  This study’s 
findings are also generally consistent with the view that independent directors contribute 
to quality financial reporting. 
 
 In summary, there are many ways to promote financial reporting quality and audit 
committee effectiveness, including through independence, accounting expertise, and 
possibly other kinds of expertise.  This may suggest that legal mandates are neither wise 
nor necessary.98  Indeed, despite the empirical evidence suggesting that audit committee 
accounting experts contribute to financial statement quality, there are contrasting 
                                                 
94 Id. 
 
95 Mark DeFond, Rebecca N. Hann & Xuesong Hu, Does the Market Value Financial Expertise on Audit 
Committees of Boards of Directors?, 43 J. ACCT. RES. 153 (2005). 
 
96 Id. 
 
97 See Jean Bedard, Sonda Marrakchi Chtourou & Lucie Courteau, The Effect of Audit Committee 
Expertise, Independence and Activity on Aggressive Earnings Management, 23 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & 
THEORY 13 (2004). 
 
98 See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 
YALE L. J. 1521 (2005) (making this point in light of the lack of evidence supporting association between 
independence and firm performance and the mixed evidence on the association between audit committee 
independence and financial reporting quality although not exploring the evidence concerning audit 
committee expertise and financial reporting quality).  
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scenarios.  At Enron, for example, both independent directors and experts on its audit 
committee failed to catch manifest irregularities.99  Even so, the evidence suggests that 
some combinations are stronger and others weaker, with the optimal combining 
independence and accounting expertise.  Yet numerous policy and legal issues arise from 
the intuition and evidence, to which the next Part turns.  
 
III. THE FUTURE ROLE OF EXPERTISE 
 
 A normative implication of the empirical evidence on expertise is to encourage—
if not mandate—the appointment of accounting experts to audit committees.  After all, 
CEOs—and many other business experts—rarely have knowledge of generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS) or rules 
and regulations of the SEC and applicable securities laws.100   
 
 Objections to a mandatory or even hortatory commitment to board expertise, 
including on audit committees, concern the considerable burden of expectations that 
would befall those members.  The burden is significant as a practical matter given lack of 
specification of what those expectations should be.  It is exacerbated by uncertainty as to 
what legal consequences follow from the fact that a director has expertise.  The following 
considers each of these problems in turn. 
  
A.  Specifications 
 
 Rediscovering the value expertise underscores a significant shift at the basic level 
of specifying the expertise that boards of directors should wield.  Before the SOX era 
spawned interest in substantive expertise, theorizing about expected expertise was 
limited.  Professor Eugene Fama offered the general theory that independent directors 
contributed expertise in “decision control.”101   It is possible that decision control is the 
expertise that all independent directors offer,102 yet that imagines boards as monoliths 
without attention to particular skills that, under the division of labor, contribute 
individualized value. 
 
 While focusing on expertise associated with quality financial reporting, SOX 
recognizes that directors, independent and otherwise, each can contribute different 
expertise.  In the future, one should expect increased attention to other kinds of expertise 
that exploit the division of labor too, such as in recruiting business leadership through 
                                                 
99 See William W. Bratton, Jr., Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275, 
1333-38 (2002); Paul M. Healy & Krishna G. Palepu, Governance and Intermediation Problems in Capital 
Markets: Evidence from the Fall of Enron (Harvard NOM Working Paper No. 02-27, Aug. 15, 2002), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=325440. 
 
100 See Dennis Beresford, Take a Seat in the Boardroom, 200 J. ACCOUNTANCY 104 (2005). 
 
101 Fama, supra note ___. 
 
102 For criticism, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of 
Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 771 (2002). 
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nominating committees boasting not merely independence but knowledge of relevant 
labor markets and designing compensation systems using directors who are not merely 
independent but knowledgeable on the subject.   Sparked by SOX, the following focuses 
solely on specifying the expertise that it seems to contemplate in order to highlight both 
the importance and difficulty of doing so. 
 
 SOX appears to demand expertise to promote financial reporting quality. True, 
SOX covers much ground by tinkering with many aspects of corporate governance.  But 
there is no doubt that SOX was inspired by problems with accounting and control 
systems and sought to respond with tools to improve both.103  Thus it emphasizes internal 
control, adding in its most elaborate provisions, Sections 103 and 404 concerning 
maintaining, certifying and auditing internal control.104  Many consider the rearrangement 
of the audit supervision function to be among SOX’s most important changes.105  In 
short, SOX is about accounting and so the expertise on audit committees should be 
accounting expertise—not necessarily the broader conceptions reflected in the SEC’s 
final definition.  
 
 The historical catalyst for independent directors and developments in intervening 
decades also supports this view.  During the 1970s, and since SOX, the expertise 
expected from independent directors appears more in the nature of expertise in internal 
control systems designed to promote financial reporting quality and compliance with 
law.106 The 1970s bribery scandals that led to laws requiring internal control systems and 
independent directors were logical servants of compliance.  In the late 1990s, even a 
Delaware court, in Caremark,107 questioned the continuing validity of the 1963 Graham 
decision that minimized director responsibilities over internal control.108   
 
                                                 
103 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Preamble. 
 
104 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Facilitating Auditing’s New Early Warning System:  Control Disclosure, 
Auditor Liability and Safe Harbors, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 1449 (2004). 
 
105 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 367 
(2006); Erica Beecher-Monas, Corporate Governance in the Wake of Enron: An Examination of the Audit 
Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357 (2003); Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley 
and Accounting, supra note ___, at 1034-36. 
 
106 See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Board of Directors and Internal Control, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 237 
(1997); Michael P. Dooley, Two Models of Corporate Governance, 47 BUS. LAW. 461 (1992).  
 
107 In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
  
108 Caremark’s language and subsequent Delaware court applications of it suggest that it poses no real 
liability threat to directors, see  Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006), but Delaware law rarely does but 
its admonitions can play a norm-shaping function.  See Melvin A. Eisenberg, Corporate Law and Social 
Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253 (1999); Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware 
Corporate Law Work?, 44 UCLA L REV. 1009 (1997); David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in Corporate Law, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811 (2001). 
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 The demand for accounting expertise is reflected in audit committee charters 
widely adopted in SOX’s wake.  A survey of selected charters is revealing.  First, there is 
substantial standardization of these documents across a variety of enterprises.109  Second, 
they tend to concentrate on fundamentals of accounting, along with internal controls.  A 
reasonable inference from the objectives stated in these charters is that the implicit 
expectations can be met only by those with accounting expertise.110  It is likely that they 
require an understanding not only of accounting principles and inherent need for 
estimates but also (1) the various maneuvers available to massage reported accounting 
results and (2) relative conservatism and the consequences of achieving any given level 
of conservatism. 
 
 Despite this plausible claim that SOX and current audit committee members seek 
to use accounting expertise and internal control to promote financial reporting quality, 
such statements are broad and conceal trade offs.  Expertise may enable an enterprise to 
promote quality financial reporting in conformity with GAAP, GAAS and SEC 
regulations—including internal control requirements—but these subjects allow for 
considerable leeway in application.  The following explores two examples of the 
challenges that result: (1) earnings management raises the issue of how involved audit 
committee accounting experts must be in substantive decisions that managers make in 
pursuing desired accounting results and (2) conservatism raises the issue of whose 
interests audit committee accounting experts should seek to promote. 
 
 1.  Earnings Management.  Managers can deliberately influence reported financial 
results through manipulation of discretionary accounting estimates and allocations (called 
“accounting earnings management”) or though manipulation of discretionary 
expenditures (referred to as “real earnings management”).111  Survey evidence indicates 
that managers engage in real earnings management when necessary to meet targeted or 
expected accounting results, such as earnings per share.112  Empirical evidence is strong 
                                                 
109 See also LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, LAW & ACCOUNTING: CASES AND MATERIALS 612-15 (2005) 
(presenting illustrative audit committee charter). 
 
110 See also Krishnan & Visvanathan, supra note ___, at ___ (noting that audit committee charters are 
standardized, giving examples from Ruby Tuesday and eBay). 
 
111 See Sugata Roychowdhury, Management of Earnings Through the Manipulation of Real Activities that 
Affect Cash Flow From Operations (working paper 2005) (providing a model to measure real earnings 
management, relating levels of actual operating cash flows, discretionary expenditures such as R&D and 
SG&A, and production costs to normal levels estimated by industry and company experience and finding 
evidence of real earnings management for sample of enterprises from 1987 to 2001).  Real earnings 
management can be achieved through any means that enables the acceleration or delay of recognizing 
events, thus including decisions concerning investment, inventory, training and so on. 
 
112 See John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey & Shivaram Rajgopal, The Economic Implications of 
Corporate Financial Reporting, 40 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3 (2005) and John R. Graham, Campbell R. Harvey 
& Shivaram Rajgopal, Value Destruction and Financial Reporting Decisions (working paper 2006) (Fall 
2003 survey reveals that CFOs think EPS is important and are willing to use real earnings management to 
meet expectations or to smooth, with 80% saying they would decrease discretionary spending on R&D, 
advertising, and maintenance to meet earnings expectations and 55% saying they would delay a positive net 
present value investment project to meet earnings expectations).   
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that accounting expertise on audit committees reduces accounting earnings 
management.113  Empirical evidence concerning whether audit committee accounting 
expertise influences real earnings management is both limited114 and conflicting, with 
studies showing both absence115 and presence116 of a negative correlation. 
 
 Whether audit committee experts influence real earnings management may 
depend, in part, on whether they believe that is their responsibility, because no authority 
specifies what their purpose is.  SOX, the SEC and the exchanges only suggest or require 
expert presence without saying anything about its purpose.  Authoritative silence on the 
purpose of expertise leads to two competing views in the literature. 
 
 One view sees audit committees as monitors and enforcers, whose presence is 
solely to assure compliance with what law, accounting and regulations require.117   If so, 
then accounting earnings management is their bailiwick, but real earnings management is 
not.  Under the other view, audit committee experts are present for the purposes of 
directing and monitoring the management of the enterprise, including decisions 
concerning internal resource allocation.118  That role includes understanding whether 
resource allocation decisions are driven by substantive business judgments concerning 
long-term value enhancement or by short-term aspirations or pressures to achieve 
designated accounting results such as meeting earnings per share expectations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
113 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
114 See Krishnan & Visvanathan, supra note ___, at 34 (“there is limited evidence on whether audit 
committees are able to constrain real earnings management”). 
 
115 See Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & Neal, supra note ___ (finding no negative association between 
audit committee expertise and real earnings management). This study actually finds a positive association 
between audit committee expertise and the component of real earnings management involving the level of 
discretionary expenditures.  Id. at 5. 
 
116 See Krishnan & Visvanathan, supra note ___, at 7 (finding negative association between audit 
committee accounting expertise and real earnings management); id. at 34 (greater audit committee 
accounting expertise “mitigates tendencies to manipulate earnings through real activities”). 
 
117 See Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & Neal, supra  note ___ (“Since real earnings management is within 
the bounds of GAAP, we argue that it is not in the purview of the audit committee.”); id. (“Real earnings 
management . . .  is not illegal[,] not a violation of financial reporting rules, and even if discovered would 
not result in charges of financial fraud or create cause for an earnings restatement.  Thus, we argue that it is 
beyond the scope of the audit committee’s responsibility to filter out real earnings management.”); id. at 29 
(real earnings management “is generally not fraudulent and would be well within the accepted province of 
management’s discretion”); see also Hillary A. Sale, Independent Directors as Securities Monitors, 61 
BUS. LAW. 1375 (2006). 
 
118 See Krishnan & Visvanathan, supra note ___, at 35 (also opining that audit committee member 
incentives to constrain real earnings management are the same as those for accounting earnings 
management: knowledge base, job expectations stated in charter plus litigation and reputation risk). 
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 The latter view seems compelling as a matter of law, logic and policy.  As a 
matter of law, committee experts are directors too and directors are not excused from 
understanding, reviewing or even controlling internal firm resource allocations—
whatever their specific purpose.  As a matter of logic, the distinction between accounting 
earnings management and real earnings management is ultimately superficial—both are 
artificial exercises.   Most importantly, as a matter of policy, evidence is strong that the 
post-SOX reduction in accounting earnings management has increased managerial 
appetite and resolve to pursue real earnings management.119  Determining that audit 
committee accounting experts should police accounting earnings management but not 
real earnings management would produce a policy backfire. 
  
 The backfire would be at least as serious as the problem that accounting earnings 
management presents, although the problems differ slightly.  The problem with 
accounting earnings management is that investors are misled into sub-optimal capital 
allocation decisions that could result in investment losses.  The problem with real 
earnings management is that managers deliberately commit to sub-optimal capital 
allocation decisions that almost certainly, although stealthily and indirectly, inflict 
investment losses on investors.120  Accordingly, the expectations and duties of audit 
committee experts should include controlling real earnings management precisely as 
much as accounting earnings management.121  At least, specification of expectations is in 
order. 
 
 2. Conservatism.  A general definition of conservatism in accounting is a 
prudential preference, in the face of uncertainty, to understate economic reality rather 
than overstate it.122 In practice, this entails the understatement of net assets by more 
                                                 
119 See Daniel A. Cohen, Aiyesha Dey & Thomas Lys, Trends in Earnings Management in the Pre- and 
Post-Sarbanes Oxley Periods (working paper 2005) (finding post-SOX accounting earnings management 
has declined but real earnings management has increased); Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & Neal, supra 
note ___, at 31 (findings suggest that accounting experts “can mitigate earnings management via 
discretionary accruals” but that managers “react by increasing real earnings management”). 
 
120 See Carcello, Hollingsworth, Klein & Neal, supra  note ___ (“Real earnings management may diminish 
firm and shareholder value . . . ”); Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal,  supra note ____. 
 
121 See Graham, Harvey & Rajgopal, supra note ____ (suggesting that boards and audit committees should 
exercise oversight to prevent managerial decisions that promote real earnings management while 
destroying corporate and shareholder value). 
 
122 FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2 ¶¶ 91-95. 
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timely recognition of losses compared to gains.123  These conceptions can be unpacked by 
specifying the circumstances in which such asymmetric recognition can occur.124   
 
 Strong conservatism would describe a pervasive preference so that no or few 
circumstances depart from that norm, epitomized in such traditional dictums as the lower 
of cost or market principle.  Weak conservatism would describe a limited preference so 
that numerous contexts allow departures from that kind of dictum, such as where fair 
value accounting allows using actual or estimated current fair market values for 
designated asset classes (like marketable securities or property, plant and equipment).  
Neutral conservatism would designate a median position between the extremes.  
 
 Different corporate constituencies have different appetites and demand for 
relative conservatism.125  Consider four classes of potential constituents: equity investors, 
debt investors, employees compensated using accounting-based bonus systems and 
society, governmental taxation being the proxy.  All other things being equal, debt 
demands strong conservatism to protect downside risks,126 employees demand weak 
conservatism to exploit bonus payments127 and equity demands weak or neutral 
conservatism depending on time horizons and prevailing market conditions.128  While 
                                                 
123 See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principle and the Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings, 24 J. ACCT. 
& ECON. 3 (1997). A variety of definitions of conservatism appear in the literature, including proxying it by 
the level of verification required to support recognition or measurement of an accounting item.  The variety 
of definitions, and the range of emphasis placed on the principle, reflects the breadth of discretion in 
application.   
 
124 The concept of conservatism also can be tested using a wide variety of proxies.  See Krishnan & 
Visvanathan, supra note ___, at ___.  In addition to asymmetric loss recognition, examples include book-
to-market ratio; correlation between cash flows and contemporaneous accruals; and correlation between 
changes in current earnings and lagged changes in earnings.  See Anne Beatty, Joseph Weber & Jeff Yu, 
Conservatism and Debt (working paper Jan. 2006). 
 
125 See Langevoort, Social Construction of SOX, supra note ___, at 1839 (“conservative financial reporting 
is comforting to creditors, shareholders, and others who see it as a disciplinary or monitoring tool [but with 
a] corresponding loss in accuracy. . . . [C]onservative GAAP reporting on average understates the true 
economic value of the firm. . . . How much, if at all, conservative reporting deprives investors of useful 
information is controversial” (citing Anil Arya et al., Are Unmanaged Earnings Always Better for 
Shareholders?, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 111 (Supp. 2003)). 
 
126 See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE L.J. 439, 477 (2003) 
(debt investors prefer conservative accounting because they do not enjoy capital appreciation and so 
concentrate on negative analysis of default risk and rely on hard assets for ultimate recovery). Other 
advantages of conservatism for debt investors include how resulting accounting would sooner signal 
adversity and trigger applicable remedial rights such as acceleration.  See Raymond J. Ball, Ashok Robin & 
Gil Sadka, Is Accounting Conservatism Due to Debt or Equity Markets? An International Test of 
“Contracting” and “Value Relevance” Theories of Accounting (working paper 2005). 
 
127 Other employees likely exhibit risk aversion akin to debt investors.  See Bratton, Shareholder Value and 
Auditor Independence, supra note ___, at 477. 
 
128 See Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, supra note ___, at 455-63 (providing a 
taxonomy of equity investors arrayed according to their diverse types: speculators, investors, short-term 
holders, long-term holders, noise traders, fundamental value investors, dumb money, and smart money); id. 
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government may prefer weak conservatism to maximize immediate tax revenue (setting 
aside supply-side effects), to minimize tax obligations enterprises prefer strong 
conservatism (to the extent that financial and tax accounting regimes are co-extensive).  
In whose interests shall audit committee accounting experts draw the conservatism line 
amid resulting trade-offs? 
 
 Two constraints ameliorate the magnitude of these trade-offs, but they are 
incomplete, leaving the question and significant challenges open.  First, accounting 
standards established through formal standard setting limit the discretionary range.  But 
they do not eliminate it.  GAAP historically embedded a conservatism principle, 
generally favoring asymmetric recognition of losses compared to gains.  But it allowed a 
range within which conservatism could be relatively stronger or weaker in designated 
contexts, such as estimating warranty reserves and loss contingencies.129  Moreover, 
GAAP is becoming less conservative through expanded use of fair value accounting and 
by moving away from traditional dictums such as the lower of cost or market principle.130  
Accordingly, managers—and audit committee accounting experts—face choices along 
the conservatism continuum within existing standards and will have more discretion 
under broadening fair value standards. 
 
 Second, debt contract covenants can be used to supply conservatism that lenders 
demand, without regard to relative conservatism of official standards or decisions 
enterprises make when producing published financial statements.131  While there is some 
modest empirical evidence that lenders use covenants to do this,132 the weight of the 
evidence indicates that contractual modifications only partly satisfy lender demand for 
accounting conservatism.133  For example, studies show a positive correlation between 
                                                                                                                                                 
at 465-72 (illustrating range of shareholder demand functions using examples of relatively benign cookie 
jar reserves to more aggressive earnings management through the timing of revenue recognition and 
finding that even in the more extreme contexts the shareholder interest, subject to changing environments 
over time, “does not unite against management and aggressive accounting”) 
 
129 See CUNNINGHAM, LAW & ACCOUNTING, supra note ___, at ___ (excerpting selections from relevant 
standards). 
 
130 See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair Value as the 
Fundamental Principle of GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839 (1996); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 7, USING CASH FLOW INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN 
ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS (Feb. 2000); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL 
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, 
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (1998); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF 
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 142 GOODWILL AND OTHER INTANGIBLE ASSETS (2001). 
 
131 Debt contract terms invariably reflect conservatism, as where covenants count losses fully and credit 
gains only partly.  See Beatty, Weber & Yu, supra note ___.  
 
132 See Wayne R. Guay & Robert E. Verrecchia, Discussion of Bushman and Piotroski and Theory of 
Conservative Accounting (working paper 2006). 
 
133 Roy L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part I: Explanations and Implications, 17 ACCT. HORIZONS 
207 (2003); Roy L. Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part II: Evidence and Research Opportunities, 17 
ACCT. HORIZONS 287 (2003); see also Raymond J. Ball, Ashok Robin & Gil Sadka, Is Accounting 
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contractual tailoring toward conservatism and conservative financial reporting apart from 
that tailoring.134  The costs of contracting are too great to meet lender demand for 
conservatism entirely by contract.135 The empirical results support conjectures and 
historical evidence that the conservatism principle in GAAP arose from lender demand 
for standardization of conservatism to reduce costs of contracting.136 
  
 Two other factors amplify the magnitude of the trade-offs, increasing their 
significance and accentuating the question of audit committee beneficiaries. First, 
managers are commonly those employees who are compensated according to accounting-
based measurements.  They have strong incentives against conservatism and essentially 
set its level.   Again, this reality partly explains why US accounting standards historically 
embed the conservatism principle.137  Audit committee accounting experts have an 
important monitoring and control function to play in negotiating the competing demands 
for relative conservatism, particularly when managers have incentives to demand weak 
conservatism, at best.138 
 
 Second, equity investors exhibit demand for neutral to weak conservatism 
according to respective time horizons and market conditions.139 Short-term equity 
investors demand weaker conservatism, while long-term investors demand stronger 
conservatism.  In periods of economic expansion and rising stock prices, equity investors 
                                                                                                                                                 
Conservatism Due to Debt or Equity Markets? An International Test of “Contracting” and “Value 
Relevance” Theories of Accounting (working paper 2005) (international data showing economies with 
larger debt than equity markets produce more conservative reports, implying that lender demand influences 
financial reporting outcomes). 
 
134 Beatty, Weber & Yu, supra note ___ 
 
135 Beatty, Weber & Yu, supra note ___ (“findings suggest that lenders may find it too costly to meet their 
demand for conservatism through contract modifications [so that] [a]s GAAP becomes less conservative, 
borrowers may be forced to make more conservative accounting choices within GAAP to avoid the costly 
modifications to contract GAAP.”). 
 
136 Roy L. Watts, A Proposal for Research on Conservatism (unpublished manuscript 1993); see also FIN. 
ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS NO. 2, QUALITATIVE 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ACCOUNTING INFORMATION, 94 (1980) (noting a preference of lenders for 
conservative accounting). 
. 
137 See Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part I, supra note ___ (conservatism facilitates monitoring of 
managers and contracts by constraining overpayments to managers); Watts, Conservatism in Accounting 
Part II supra note ___ (same). 
 
138 If audit committee financial experts were compensated in any part using accounting-based measures, 
these functions would become more difficult to perform.   The role of incentive compensation also points to 
the importance of related expertise—not so much independence—on the board compensation committee.  It 
also suggests developing critical relationships between experts on the audit committee and compensation 
committee to coordinate tasks to achieve optimal enterprise policies.  
 
139 Beatty, Weber & Yu, supra note ___ (noting how lenders demand conservative accounting given 
asymmetric nature of claims, in contrast to equity which prefer symmetric or neutral accounting). 
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tend to demand weaker conservatism and in economic downturns and bear markets 
preferences tend to return to stronger conservatism.140  This variation adds competing 
demand functions that audit committee accounting experts should be expected to balance.  
 
 Finally, the tax function cuts both ways.141  Supply-side theory aside, government 
may seek weaker conservatism in corporate financial reporting but other constituents—
equity, debt, and employees—prefer comparatively stronger conservatism.  At least this 
is true to the extent that GAAP and tax accounting impose uniform requirements, which 
is not always the case in the United States.  But there are important contexts in which the 
two requirements are co-extensive, as with inventory accounting to take an example for 
merchandising enterprises. And empirical evidence demonstrates that tax-paying 
enterprises use more conservative accounting than tax-exempt entities.142  The result is an 
additional factor that influences the degree of conservatism that financial reports 
supply—and additional challenges for audit committee financial experts. 
 
 This is not to suggest that the trade-offs are un-resolvable.  They frequently are 
resolved, among standard-setters and preparers alike.143  The critical point is that the 
demand for conservatism is relative and varies across corporate constituencies.  GAAP 
reposes extensive discretion, even under its conservatism principle, and contracts do not 
satisfy all lender demand for conservatism.  Conflicting interests are acute for managers 
enjoying accounting-based bonuses.  Resolving these trade-offs suggests an important 
role for audit committee accounting experts even though authoritative guidance is 
lacking.144   
 
 To the extent that such experts are expected to perform new functions in the post-
SOX environment, clarifying these trade-offs would be desirable.  In theory, the 
prescription may simply be that, as directors, the audit committee should act in the 
interests of shareholders.145  But shareholder demand for conservatism varies across 
shareholder types and with market conditions.  And the greater the bias for weak 
                                                 
140 Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, supra note ___, at 455-63. 
 
141 See Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part I, supra note ___. 
 
142 Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part II supra note ___ (empirical evidence showing that tax paying 
enterprises use more conservative accounting than tax exempt entities). 
 
143 See Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part I, supra note ___ (lender demand drives conservatism in 
law, standards, contracts, and practice; FASB and reporting enterprises all balance competing demands of 
equity and debt when setting and applying standards); Watts, Conservatism in Accounting Part II supra 
note ___ (same). 
 
144 See Krishnan & Visvanathan, supra note ___ (despite importance of conservatism principle, there is 
“limited empirical evidence of the relation between audit committee characteristics and conservatism”). 
 
145 Cf. Lynn A. Stout, The Investor Confidence Game, 68 BROOKLYN L. REV. 407, 433-34, n. 71 (2002); 
Homer Kripke, The SEC, the Accountants, Some Myths and Some Realities, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1151, 1188-
91 (1970). 
 
 27
conservatism, the greater is the managerial discretion.146 The new expertise on audit 
committees is intended to address managerial abuse of accounting discretion. This opens 
an alternative prescription: audit committee accounting experts have duties akin to those 
of auditors, meaning duties owed equally to shareholders and debt investors.147   
 
 These plausible alternatives suggest that the need is acute to clarify to whom audit 
committee accounting experts should be beholden.  This inquiry is not to say that all audit 
committees should work to supply any particular level of conservatism or that law should 
supply the incentives to achieve such an objective.  The exact demand and supply of 
conservatism varies among enterprises and across time according to varying capital 
structures and constituency demographics (including use of accounting-based bonus 
compensation and tax status).   
 
 Moreover, there is no way for accounting standards or external auditors to define 
the optimal supply and demand intercept in general or for a particular enterprise.  But 
someone must exercise the resulting discretion among competing trade-offs.  Managers 
do so in the first instance, but isn’t it reasonable to ask experts within the enterprise to 
promote the optimal supply in response to varying demand?  If so, the logical persons to 
do so are audit committee accounting experts.  This does not ipso facto warrant judicial 
or regulatory intrusion into those decisions.  On the contrary, if directors command 
expertise, judges and regulators—lacking it—should grant them as much latitude that 
independent directors have enjoyed for four decades. 
 
 The next section pursues this line of inquiry further, but before proceeding the 
observation concerning fair value accounting mentioned above bears elaboration.  
Conservative accounting traditions, such as the lower of cost or market principle, 
emphasize reliability over relevance when these traits are at odds.  Fair value accounting 
is not conservative, being symmetrical to gains and losses and having no preference for 
lower or higher asset amounts.  It purports to emphasize relevance over reliability.  But, 
as noted, relevance may differ across constituents.  Fair value accounting may be more 
“relevant” to equity investors and less relevant to debt investors. 148 
 
 Yet even this proposition is doubtful, because fair value accounting simply uses 
prevailing valuations over other measures.  Those values may not be relevant either to 
equity investors or debt investors (or any other constituents).  Prevailing valuations are 
drawn from market transactions, if available, and from managerial estimates, if they are 
                                                 
146 See Faith Stevelman Kahn, Transparency and Accountability: Rethinking Corporate Fiduciary Law’s 
Relevance to Corporate Disclosure, 34 GA. L. REV. 505, 507-18 (2000); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Legal 
Models of Management Structure in the Modern Corporation: Officers, Directors, and Accountants, 63 
CAL. L. REV. 375, 417-19, 424-30 (1975). 
 
147 See United States v. Arthur Young & Co., 465 U.S. 805 (1984) (“The independent public accountant 
performing this special [public] function owes ultimate allegiance to the corporation's creditors and 
stockholders, as well as to the investing public.”) 
 
148 See Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, supra note ___, at 478-79. 
 
 28
not.  That expands managerial discretion and points to an important particular function 
for audit committee experts: to police fair value assumptions.  The move towards fair 
value accounting thus will underscore the challenge for audit committee experts in 
determining their purpose and how best to meet it. 
  
B.  Adjustments 
 
 Audit committee accounting experts add value to corporate governance, yet 
receive no special benefits from contributing it compared to other directors and can face 
disincentives and threatened penalties.  Both points require review.  The following first 
explores disincentives that arise from the curious but common habits of celebrating 
independence, rewarding it over expertise, and holding that independence and expertise 
are mutually exclusive.  Discussion then explores how law, especially Delaware 
corporate law, reinforces these biases by rewarding independence and penalizing 
expertise. 
 
 1. Compatibility.  It is customary to observe a trade-off between director 
independence and director expertise.  This relationship may hold for expertise that arises 
from corporate knowledge commanded only by senior executives.  That kind of expertise, 
which may be called “status expertise,” is mutually exclusive with attributes of 
detachment associated with most definitions of independence.  Both sorts of directors 
contribute different kinds of value.  The status expert may have greater ability than the 
outsider to identify excesses or duplicities of a CEO.  The outsider may have greater 
freedom or capacity to act on that ability to interdict CEO shenanigans.  Not only are the 
roles mutually exclusive in this sense they are also mutually complementary.  The 
challenge is to find the optimal combination of these different kinds of expertise.149 
 
 The customary trade-off analysis has less force when expertise is considered as 
substantive command of a specialized field of knowledge, such as accounting.  A director 
having no other affiliation with a corporation and providing accounting expertise presents 
none of the trade-offs between independence and that particular kind of expertise.  
Rather, the independent expert director adds mutually complementary value by bringing 
detachment, along with useful knowledge.  Considering the weight of empirical evidence, 
the value that independence alone adds is tenuous compared to the strong contributions to 
quality financial reporting that independence plus accounting expertise makes.150 
 
 Seen in this light, existing federal law and exchange rules are unobjectionable.  
They leave corporations with substantial flexibility to achieve optimal board design.  
                                                 
149 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Corporation, 2004 NZ L. REV. 707, 719 (2004) (stating that 
the optimal combination may be determined by thinking of the relationship between the marginal cost and 
the marginal benefit of an additional independent director compared to inside directors). 
 
150 This remains so even if independence alone may contribute advantages to corporate governance that 
elude capture in statistical models testing its association with corporate performance, supra text 
accompanying notes ___-___, and despite how independence alone sometimes associates with financial 
reporting quality, supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
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Independence is rewarded in certain circumstances, such as concerning executive 
compensation and taxation matters at the board level.151 It is addressed by SOX’s rules 
speaking to audit committee obligations.152  But companies are free to have as many or as 
few independent directors as they wish.153  They are also free to have any number and 
type of persons wielding any variety of expertise.  Although SOX’s have-or-disclose 
provision encourages having experts on audit committees and exchange rules require 
some expertise, neither definition of expertise is rigorous.   Further, federal law provides 
that designation of an audit committee member as such an expert imposes no greater or 
different duty or liability risk on that director compared to other directors.154 
 
 Despite the empirical reality and federal law flexibility, it may be tempting to 
believe that the customary trade off between independence and status expertise carries 
over to the context of substantive expertise.   In some federal securities law contexts and 
in exchange rules, the definition of independence concentrates on the amount of money 
and benefits a person receives in various capacities from the corporation.  Too much is 
said to impair independence.  For example, exchange rules provide that one loses 
independence if income from advisory, consulting or related activities exceeds designated 
dollar amounts ($60,000 under Nasdaq rules and $100,000 for NYSE companies).155  
 
 SOX goes further, saying that independence and expertise are mutually exclusive 
as a functional matter, denying that anyone can be independent if performing expert 
services, outside a directorial capacity, for a given corporation.  One corporate 
governance scholar testified before Congress that if a person is to provide consulting 
services, he should be retained as a consultant, and if he is to provide directorial services, 
he is to be nominated and elected as a director; in binary fashion, the witness testified that 
“You cannot blend the two.”156  While this view is congruent with the customary trade-
off applicable to outsiders compared to those with status expertise (insiders), it is harder 
to square with the injection of substantive expertise where that trade-off dissolves.   
 
                                                 
151 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
152 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
153 See, e.g., Charu G. Raheja, Determinants of Board Size and Composition: A Theory of Corporate 
Boards, 40 J. FIN. & QUANT. ANALY. 283 (2005); Dan R. Dalton, Number of Directors and Financial 
Performance: A Meta-Analysis, 42 ACAD. MGMT. J. 674, 676 (1999) (surveying studies); Bhagat & Black, 
The Uncertain Relationship, supra note ___, at 941-42 (summarizing studies suggesting difficulty in 
establishing optimal size). 
 
154 See SEC Release (Jan. 23, 2003) (text accompanying notes 34-38 explaining inclusion of safe harbor 
against exposing audit committee financial expert to any different legal liability than other directors and 
expressing the opinion that this should obtain under both federal securities laws and state corporation laws). 
 
155 Nasdaq Rule ___; NYSE Rule ____.    
 
156 See Douglas M. Branson, Too Many Bells? Too Many Whistles? Corporate Governance in the Post-
Enron, Post-WorldCom Era, 58 S.C. L. REV. 65, 82-90 (2006) (quoting testimony of Professor Charles 
Elson, University of Delaware).  
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 An expert in accounting remains an expert in accounting when serving either as a 
director or as a consultant.  Treating the activities as mutually exclusive gives content to 
the makeweight arguments opposing the SEC’s original definition of the relevant 
expertise: fewer qualified people will be available and attracting them will absorb 
resources from other recruiting efforts.157  Corporations that recognize the value of 
expertise among directors will pay expert directors more—and classify payments as 
director compensation, not outside compensation.158 This reveals the constraints as 
formalistic (evidenced further by how exchange rules use fixed dollar figures for all 
directors rather than specifying compensation in meaningful terms such as a percentage 
of a person’s adjusted gross income or net worth). 
 
 In such an environment, experts may prefer consulting to serving as members of a 
board of directors.  Consultancy became an increasingly appealing line of work 
throughout the period of the monitoring board’s ascendancy, which may be explained by 
the decline of interest in board expertise as the advisory model ceded to the monitoring 
model.159  The appeal of consulting was reinforced by how consultants can serve in 
capacities that are equivalent to other gatekeepers—including independent directors, 
auditors, and lawyers—but without associated burdens or liability risks.160  Under the 
mutually exclusive approach, rules drive more experts off of boards and into consulting. 
Yet if expertise is desired on boards—as intuition, evidence and brewing change 
suggests—this framework requires adjustment.  This is not to say that pristine definitions 
of independence must be forsaken, but to appreciate that zealous commitment to such 
purity carries a higher price than seems to be appreciated.  
 
 2.  Incentives.  More acute talent pool contraction arises from the strange reality 
that, in Delaware at least, independent directors enjoy extraordinary deference and face 
essentially no risk of judicial rebuke whereas expert directors are held to a higher 
standard of performance. These strange consequences follow from the awkward structure 
of director duties, which traditionally are classified as the duties of loyalty and care.161  
                                                 
157 See supra text accompanying notes ___-___. 
 
158 See Clarke, Three Models of the Independent Director, supra note ___,  at 80 & 84. 
 
159 See Gordon, supra note ___, at 1513-14 & n. 185 (the “advisory board . . . included . . . knowledgeable 
parties [who] could serve as a useful sounding board for the CEO, a kitchen cabinet, and could provide 
expertise . . .  In an important sense, boards were an extension of management. . . . Thus another way to 
understand the movement from the advisory to the monitoring board is in terms of the rise of consultants, 
who can better provide cross-industry expertise and strategic counseling than board members recruited by 
the CEO.”).  
 
160 See CHRISTOPHER D. MCKENNA, THE WORLD’S NEWEST PROFESSION: MANAGEMENT CONSULTING IN 
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006).  True, also, expert consulting firms can face liability risks for breach of 
contract or perhaps negligence when advice they give or projects they contribute backfire in ways that 
breach contracts or constitute torts.  But that kind of liability exposure differs considerably from imposed 
on recognized gatekeepers.   Id. 
 
161 More recently, a splinter duty that Delaware courts call good faith has appeared, although it is in fact a 
longstanding component of the other duties. See Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in 
Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1 (2005); see also Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) 
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Allegations of loyalty breaches are defended by showing independence and that showing 
enables invoking the business judgment rule under which discharge of the duty of care is 
presumed.  So directors able to establish their independence are rewarded with complete 
deference under state law.  The theory of this deference is that judges are not competent 
to make business decisions (or at least are less competent than independent directors).  
 
 In contrast, a director who is an expert suffers a burden rather than enjoying a 
benefit.   A director expert in financial matters, for example, is expected to exercise that 
expertise.  If one does not, that weakens the defense against allegations of breaching any 
fiduciary duty.162 The doctrine purports to enable judicial inferences from unexercised 
expertise that a person has acted with volition—with scienter using securities law 
parlance or in breach of the duty of loyalty in corporate law terms.  Thus directors are 
penalized for commanding expertise but rewarded for independence.  
 
 Rewarding ignorance over knowledge is ironic.  Moreover, to hold an expert 
director liable for failing to exercise expertise, a judge must have first decided, as a 
substantive matter, that a transaction was unfair, as when a merger price is too low.  Irony 
thickens: directors who are independent but non-expert win deference from judges who 
say they lack business acumen while directors who are expert (without regard to 
independence) are second-guessed by those same (self-confessed) incompetent judges. 
 
 Incrementally punishing expertise while privileging independence may not matter 
much, of course, when few directors of any kind ever face personal liability for any 
decisions they make.  But to capitalize on the recognized value of this expertise, policy 
should be alert to signals being sent.  After all, signaling norms is one of the few 
important functions that Delaware courts perform.163    
 
 More important is how this stance conflicts with the concept of the division of 
labor.  Incentives for independence may be desirable to promote the optimal mixture of 
independence and status expertise on a board and even to maintain some independence 
while adding substantive expertise.  But as a matter of intuition, extensively supported by 
empirical evidence, incentives should be offered for substantive expertise too.   
 
 Benefits of the division of labor are advanced by substantive expertise in multiple 
disciplines not by increasing the outsider status of directors for the sake of achieving 
outsider status.  Encouraging substantive expertise should be at least as important—or 
more so—than encouraging independence.   Delaware courts have to wrestle with this 
problem. The solution could include following federal law, which provides that expert 
                                                                                                                                                 
(acknowledging that any duty of good faith is a component of the duty of loyalty).  
 
162 See In re Emerging Commc’ns, Inc., Civil Action No. A-16415, 2004 WL 1305745, at 40 (Del. Ch. May 
3, 2004, revised June 4, 2004) (expert director liable for failing to use financial expertise in testing financial 
fairness of cash out merger benefiting controlling shareholder).  
 
163 See supra note ___. 
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directors face no different or greater legal duty or liability risk than other directors.164  
Attracting valuable expertise to boards of directors may depend on it. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 Board independence has been the product of political compromise in most 
corporate governance debates during the past several generations.  It has been possible 
for independence to be heralded so that all sides seem to get something from it—a 
reduction in agency costs for investors (both equity and debt) and protection of the 
interests of other corporate constituencies and perhaps society.  One consequence of the 
political dimension is absence of consensus as to exactly what role independent directors 
are to play. While definitions of independence are regularly rewritten, no one knows 
exactly what independent directors are supposed to do and most evidence suggests that 
they don’t do anything particularly well.  
 
 Gestures in SOX signal a sharp, yet still inchoate, conception of expertise on audit 
committees to promote superior financial reporting.  Empirical evidence suggests that this 
works—directors with accounting expertise on audit committees are associated with more 
faithful financial reporting.  However, it remains to specify the functions and 
expectations for these experts, including regarding the role experts are to play in policing 
real earnings management and the degree of conservatism to supply. Real earnings 
management raises questions about how involved such directors should be in nominally 
substantive business decisions that amount to subterfuges to achieve accounting results; 
conservatism compels asking for whom audit committee expert directors are trustees, 
particularly whether their conduct should be guided according to the interests of equity or 
debt investors. 
 
 Taking the empirical evidence on expertise together with the history of redefining 
independence, one can predict that, in the wake of future financial scandals, reforms will 
redefine expertise too. Reforms will most likely consider using the SEC’s initial proposal 
and may event fiddle with the possibly of mandating expertise.  Debate probably will 
have to address exactly what directors are supposed to do with their expertise.  It seems 
prudent to begin these discussions before the next scandals erupt—which might even 
delay their timing, reduce their magnitude or tame their character. 
                                                 
164 Notably, in its Release adopting final rules on audit committee financial experts, the SEC opined that 
neither Sarbanes-Oxley nor the SEC regulations should affect liability, under federal or state law, of 
directors designated as audit committee financial experts. See SEC Release (Jan. 23, 2003) (text 
accompanying notes 34-38). 
 
